Abstract. There isn't nearly as much trade as standard models suggest there should be.
Introduction
There isn't nearly as much trade as standard trade models suggest that there should be. Formal trade barriers such as tariffs and quotas are far too low to account for much of the missing trade while changes in tariffs and quotas in the last 50 years explain too little of the growth in trade. Transport costs help explain the missing trade, but distance and other location variables are far too important in their trade suppressing effects to be accounted for by the effect of distance on measurable transport costs. Measured transport costs do not fall so cannot explain the growth in trade. These anomalies have until recently been ignored by the profession, perhaps in the belief that the anomalies were not important, perhaps in the belief that little progress could be made in explaining them. This paper argues that neither reason for a parenthetic treatment of missing trade is valid.
The missing trade anomaly is demonstrated to be important and to have significant patterns which cry out for explanation in Section 2. Sections 3 and 4 discuss some theoretical structures which might be used to achieve a fundamental understanding of the missing transactions costs. ignored in subsequent research; for recent discussion and an application see Anderson and Marcouiller (1999) . In this case the elasticities of the income terms are allowed to differ from unity and population and other terms may be added. The distance finding means that 2 regions separated by 500 miles will trade more than 2.67 times as much as 2 regions separated by 1000 miles, all else equal. McCallum leaves out population, which is often put in the model.
Distance
Grossman (in a comment on Frankel, Stein and Wei discussed below) argues that this magnitude of distance effect is huge, far beyond what transport costs could reasonably suggest. Deardorff (and Anderson before him) suggested that in a CES preferences structure, the coefficient on distance could be an estimate of the elasticity of substitution. If d is proportional to transport costs and these are of the iceberg melting variety, then the result holds. Iceberg melting costs (loss is proportional to distance) hardly are realistic. Thus Grossman suggests that the transport margin be modeled as
where ω represents weight (and other relevant characteristics) and < 1 might be anticipated on prior reasoning about fixed port costs vs. variable shipment costs. This means in a Cobb-Douglas framework that
With average transport costs being something like 5% or less of value, Grossman notes that it takes a huge value of α to get us to -1.42. Hummels (1998) collects detailed transport cost data for individual commodities and
shows that average transport cost margins are severely biased downward.
Using his margins of 40% or more lowers the magnitude of the work to be done by α, but not sufficiently. Reasonable values of α are probably less than
one. An elasticity of substitution greater than one helps to reduce the work to be done by but cannot help enough (replace α with σα, where σ is the elasticity of substitution). Specifically, using Hummels' margin of 40%, in order to be consistent with a distance elasticity of -1.42, σα must be equal to 4.97. Among finely differentiated products, high elasticities are plausible and confirmed by various empirical studies, but for an empirical model of substitution between aggregates national exports, elasticities are likely to be rather low.
The inescapable conclusion is ---there must be some other transactions costs. Moreover, the missing transactions costs must be very sensitive to distance, though this could be spurious correlation in a deeper model. To see this, let the missing cost be κ and repeat the exercise of finding the distance elasticity assuming that κ is not sensitive to distance:
Why Do Nations Trade (So Little)?
This only strengthens the case that the distance elasticity is too large, unless κ is very sensitive to distance. 
Border Effect

Trade of Canadian Provinces and Removal of the Border
Pricing model
All goods at retail include some local (nontraded) services, hence the pricing model is assumed to give the price of good i at location j as:
where β is the markup over cost, α is the (inverse of) the productivity parameter, γ is the cost share of the nontraded input, w is the price of the nontraded input and q is the price of the traded input. The traded input price can vary across locations due to transport costs and other effects of distance.
Thus q j i / q k i will deviates from 1 as j is further from k. Also, it is possible that the nontraded input prices w may vary more between more distant locations w j i / w k i varies as j is further from k. Finally, the productivity parameters may differ with distance. The arbitrage pricing hypothesis is that the volatility of relative prices is related to distance and the border effect.
The measure of price volatility is based on:
Here t is monthly (and 2 month difference is needed due to US data constraints). The standard deviation of P is the measure of volatility.
The basic model is
Here, D is a city dummy, r is log distance and B is a border dummy. The authors report that the findings are pretty robust with respect to various specification searches.
The lesser importance of distance as compared to McCallum, reflected in the dummy variable coefficients, is notable, but it is still too big to reasonably be explained by transport costs. Thus it is consistent with the importance of unmeasured transactions costs. And the dummies for common border and common language probably reflect something about the security of legal arrangements as well as information asymmetries.
The effect on trade of the year dummies and the time trend interacted with regional grouping is enormous if it is to be believed. Controlling for other factors, the passage of time is lowering trade dramatically, by 189% The globalization story is partly about trade to GDP ratios increasing.
This is happening in the data, but if the model is to be believed, it is driven by world economic growth acting through the gravity model's income terms.
Essentially, a converging world economy will experience a rise in world trade relative to world income. The pure theoretic gravity model predicts growth in trade to GDP ratios for all countries with below average GDP growth rates and decline in trade to GDP ratios for all countries with above average GDP growth rates. This follows from
World trade to world income will rise as countries converge in income levels. 
This follows from
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The HOV model and missing trade
Another empirical regularity which pushes up the coefficient on distance in effect is that countries trade so much with themselves. This home good bias has received interesting attention from Trefler (1995 
Implications
The evidence points to very large missing transactions costs of international trade. Moreover, the time series and cross section variation of the missing transactions cost together with clues such as home bias suggests that these costs are systematic in their variation, and likely to be endogenous with a lot of action in the endogeneity.
What are these missing costs? Here is some speculation:
What the costs are not
Not insurance costs; these are included in cif margins which on average are less than 5%. Even allowing for downward bias in aggregation, there is too much left over resistance to trade for insurance costs to explain.
Not distribution costs; these should as a first approximation affect domestic and foreign goods equally.
What the costs may be
Information costs
Information about markets is not free. The cost of obtaining information is, loosely speaking, like a tax on trade; it depresses volume. Moreover, the cost of information at further distances and across international frontiers is plausibly higher, so there is an explanation here for why international trade in particular is depressed.
Imperfect Contract Enforcement
Costs which must be sunk prior to trade induce contracts to remove or mitigate the holdup problem (ex post bargaining will ignore the sunk costs).
Recently Roberts and Tybout (1997) have documented the significance of sunk costs in the export decisions of Colombian manufacturing firms.
Contracts are usually incomplete 1 , hence one party has an incentive to default when states of nature unfavorable to the contract are realized subsequent to the signing of the contract. Contract enforcement can prevent this opportunistic behavior. Imperfect contract enforcement, being foreseen, causes potential traders to shy away from the expected losses as they face holdup on defaulted contracts. Thus it acts like a tax on trade.
The combination of relatively greater sunk costs for foreign trade than domestic along with more severe holdup problems in foreign trade is a potent explanation for resistance to trade. It predicts patterns in resistance.
The difference in development costs between foreign and domestic markets may be lower when linking markets which share language and cultural attributes (see the empirical work of Frankel, Stein and Wei). The holdup problem should be less significant when legal systems are similar or when contract enforcement is powerful and impartial. In disaggregated models of trade flows, goods which are simpler (bulk agricultural commodities such as wheat) should have smaller market development cost differences and fewer contingencies not covered in contracts, hence less significant holdup problems.
The remarkable finding of McCallum indicates that even for trade between Canada and the US, resistance looms large. If the holdup problem is to explain this, it must be substantially due to contractual incompleteness, international trade and complete contract structure is McLaren (1999) . For our purposes of explaining the variation in trade resistance across countries, the complete contract approach is not much use because the key ingredient in complete contract design is the limit on what is contractible, a limit which is not likely to vary much across countries.
since enforcement costs are unlikely to be very different. This is, however, an empirical question which should be investigated.
Insecurity
Property is not perfectly secure, and not even imperfectly secure without reference to laws and their enforcement. Imperfections in security are especially important when enforcement of property rights is across international borders.
Beside the risk to the fixed cost of market development, trade involves risks to the flow of goods.
Extortion and graft are common in some countries.
Outright theft (piracy) of goods has been common in some times and places.
Endogenous protection is a governmentally generated risk of expropriation.
This risk is uninsurable due to moral hazard in the case of antidumping and due to non-independence of risks in the case of political pressure related to the business cycle.
Nondiversifiable risks
Diversifiable risk is cheap to lay off on insurers, so long as institutions work well. I speculate that the risks to sunk trade costs are frequently nondiversifiable.
(1) In incomplete (or weakly enforceable) contract situations, moral hazard and adverse selection both will make insurance very expensive or unavailable.
(2) Undiversifiable risk like 'country risk' of expropriation, fluctuations in the enforcement of commitments to foreigners or reneging on tax/subsidy commitments cannot be diversified because all traders are affected alike. This problem affects trade even where contracts may be reasonably complete and enforceable.
(3) Randomness in extortion or graft is uninsurable because the illegality of graft payments makes an insurance contract unenforceable.
(4) Cheap self insurance under independent risks achieves diversification at a scale of trade which may be difficult to attain. A specialized trading firm may be able to achieve the required scale but faces on the one hand additional contract enforcement and incompleteness problems in arms' length transactions with ultimate sellers and ultimate buyers and faces on the other hand monitoring and incentive problems in vertically integrated operations.
Is something still missing?
Research based on information, imperfect contract enforcement and insecurity costs should proceed. But it is surprising that information costs, imperfect contract enforcement costs, or insecurity considerations in combination with nondiversifiability should loom so large in the bilateral trade of the US and Canada, two countries with a long history of amicable relations, convertible currencies with exchange risk cover widely available, a common language, common roots to their legal systems, both devoted to the protection of property with fair and reasonably incorruptible judicial systems, long adherence to GATT/WTO, etc. (NAFTA is too recent to be reflected in the data used in McCallum and Engel&Rogers).
What, if anything, is still missing? I leave this as a question for future researchers.
Directions for research
I will discuss promising directions for research in two broad areas, theoretical and empirical. Ultimately, these should be integrated tightly, but an insistence on tight integration now seems likely to limit progress.
Theory
The objective is to build consistent general equilibrium models in which the volume of trade interacts endogenously with the size of the transactions cost.
To be useful these must be tractably simple. There is reason to believe we can make progress here.
I will review promising beginnings in four areas: information costs, predation, institutional design and contract design.
Information models
Trade theory in general has made surprisingly little use of information economics, despite its growth and importance in other areas of economics.
The most highly developed models of information costs in markets are search models. These are based on agents' rational investment in information on one or both sides of the market, and are most highly developed for the labor market. Trade involves searching in 2 or more separated pools of information linked through general equilibrium interdependence. Nations' natural openness to trade (the degree of international market integration) should be partly explicable in terms of search decisions of agents at home and abroad (and these ultimately on the parameters of technology and preferences).
Cassella and Rauch (1997) offer a interesting start on applying information models to international trade in the form of a matching model.
As the model stands, there is no rational search; agents' endowment of information is exogenous. Nevertheless, their framework may be extensible in a natural way to allow search.
Trade is essentially a match between a producer and a retailer, with consumers pushed into the background. If it is a good match (in terms of quality of differentiated products, say), the agents split the surplus generated by the match. 2 If it is not a good match, they revert to their next best opportunity. In the case of international trade the next best opportunity is assumed to be at home. All agents are perfectly informed about domestic trading opportunities, agents with group ties (motivated by thinking of the overseas Chinese) are also perfectly informed about their foreign group members, while agents without group ties must randomly match up with foreign agents. In this setup, obviously, the more agents with group ties the larger the volume of trade. Casella and Rauch concern themselves with the distributional implications of group ties, showing that the agents who use group ties gain, society as a whole gains, but the agents without group ties may lose. In Casella and Rauch (1998) they extend the framework to interact with the price system, as international matching allows the labor required for production to be assigned to the lower cost country. Fixed capital in each country implies diminishing marginal product of labor. International matching can equalize wages in the global labor market and hence achieve full efficiency. This possibility is enhanced by group ties. Distributional considerations appear when group ties are unable to achieve full efficiency, in which case non-group members can be harmed by group ties. More interesting, in a 3 country world the existence of group ties between 2 of the countries which overcome informational barriers can have harmful 'trade diverting' effects such that world income declines. The point is familiar in information economics as well ---more information is not always better.
Contract Enforcement
Anderson and Young (1999) offer a formal model of the tariff equivalent of imperfect contract enforcement. The enforceability of contracts between foreign and domestic traders varies widely across countries, so it is a likely source of hidden transactions costs. Empirical work by Anderson and Marcouiller (1999) discussed below shows that imperfect contract enforcement is a powerful deterrent to trade.
Enforcement of explicit contracts depends on institutions. These may treat foreigners less fairly than locals, but the degree of bias in enforcement will vary and may be endogenous in interesting ways. Greif, Milgrom and Weingast (1994) analyze how the merchant guild enabled rulers to credibly commit to fair law enforcement in market towns. Guilds could coordinate embargoes to punish expropriation by an opportunistic prince, whereas uncoordinated merchants would have an incentive to break the embargo.
Recognizing this role of a countervailing power, rulers encouraged guilds in various ways. Anderson and Young (1999a) 
Other Contract Approaches
The type of contract adopted is endogenous to the environment and Recent research in contract theory has emphasized implicit contracts.
No contract can ever be complete, so the scope is understood to include a commitment to negotiate reasonably on a wide range of contingencies.
Insights from evolutionary economics and cognitive psychology appear to be useful. See MacLeod (1996) for a survey. The relevance to the problem of missing international trade is obvious: it is easier to understand what is implicit in a contract when dealing with a familiar. Moreover, the implicit commitment to be reasonable in renegotiations is more effective, lowering renegotiation cost, with familiars. Finally, the negative social consequences of defections from reasonability will be greater when a familiar is offended ---family, church, school and club restrain opportunistic behavior by setting codes and disciplining deviant behavior through ostracism and communicating loss of reputation. Greif (1993) 
Predation models
Another form of transactions cost is predation. Extortion by middlemen, bureaucrats or politicians is one form, theft is another. An important insight from the biological model of predation is that the size of predator and prey populations is endogenously linked in a general equilibrium model. In an economic model, the agents naturally devote resources to predation, defense or productive activity based on the marginal return; equilibrium being achieved when returns are equalized.
The possibility of risk diversification is critical. Theft is insurable under some circumstances; extortion is not insurable. Allowing for insurance (perfectly enforceable, at no cost) greatly increases the range of possible trading equilibria but still can result in no trade. Cooperation in defense or in offense will obviously also help, but the analysis is left for future work.
The model illuminates some historically important forms of predation and their effect on trade. In its extension to organized predation it may offer still more insight to modern economies with protection money required to do business. With organized defense and offense, it may yield insight into the competition of the state and the triads.
Models like these seem to hold out some promise of insight into trade and endogenous transactions costs for at least some countries. Theft is widespread and often uninsured even in modern economies ---see World
Trade, (1998) for evidence. Recent models which explain the lack of response to exchange rate changes have focused on fixed setup costs in trade. Once paid these are sunk costs, so they serve as a barrier to entry to new firms. There may also be exit costs, which serve as a barrier to exit by incumbent firms. These phenomena lead to hysteresis, whereby temporary exchange rate appreciations may lead to permanent increases in imports.
Models of Risk Diversifying Institutions
What are these sunk costs? Roberts and Tybout suggest the following possibilities.
• Information costs about prices, potential buyers and product standards or requirements in foreign markets.
• lending practices: no Colombian banks were willing to lend against export orders or letters of credit from purchasers' banks. This is attributed to banks' inability to judge the likely success of Colombian exporters. It hurt mainly first time sellers (or sellers in new markets).
• regime uncertainty: would exchange rate changes persist. Dixit (1989) has emphasized the option value of waiting before incurring irreversible costs in the face of uncertainty. Export markets at startup almost by definition are more uncertain than are domestic markets.
Evidence on the importance of sunk costs has mostly been aggregative, mixing together the trade volume in individual firms with entry and exit of firms. The results were mixed in previous empirical studies.
Roberts and Tybout use a plant level panel data set on exports to examine the sunk export cost idea. Their data is consistent with sunk costs.
A summary of the panel data shows that it takes a large and persistent depreciation to raise export participation much. 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 exch. The econometric study is a reduced form estimation of the probability of exporting. This turns out to be significantly affected by recent past exports of the plant. The usefulness of the sunk investment depreciates rapidly, in that after 2 years, a firm which has previously exported is no more likely to export than a firm which never has. For example, for plants at the median in terms of characteristics (age of plant, size of plant, etc.) the probability of exporting as a function of past experience rises from 0.002 to 0.146 as we go from never having exported to having exported last period. (Remember, most plants do not export.) For plants at the 75th percentile in characteristics (but the median in terms of plant 'fixed effects') the probability goes from 0.022 to 0.431.
Colombian Manufactures Exports of 19 three digit ISIC Industries
Unfortunately the data do not permit identifying the magnitude of the sunk cost. However, we can certainly infer a substantial size: a 28% depreciation of the currency only boosted aggregate participation by 2%.
Further work on the empirics of trade costs is important. Case study analyses can turn up direct evidence on fixed trade costs. With a broad enough base of cases, it might be possible to construct some reasonable aggregates to apply to other firms.
It would be very useful to get more firm level data on the actual trade costs. The private nature of firm data makes it difficult for researchers to obtain in any event, but the special difficulty of data on firm level trading costs is that some payments at least are illegal for either the payer or the payee. With proper institutional commitments to protect the privacy of participants, it may be possible to make some progress here. An example is the World Bank (1997), which unfortunately is so limited that only one individual at the Bank is permitted to use the data.
Security and international flows
Less satisfactory but more generally usable is work on industry level flows of investment or trade and their relation to measures of security.
Recent empirical work on the effect of corruption on international investment has turned up significant effects. Using survey data taken from businessmen, finds that foreign direct investment is substantially deterred by perceived corruption. This work is quite interesting despite the problematic nature of interpreting the survey responses ---corruption in the form of a highly certain graft of 10% may be less deterring to investment than a much less certain graft with mean 5%. Anderson and Marcouiller (1999) Gould (1994) , Head and Ries (1998) and Rauch and Trindade (1999) . The latter disaggregate trade into differentiated and homogeneous products. They find that within Southeast Asia the importance of ethnic Chinese ties for differentiated products is much greater than for homogeneous products, whereas elsewhere, while ethnic ties increase trade generally there is no difference in the effect between differentiated and homogeneous products. Rauch (1999) argues that enforcement against opportunistic behavior should be equally important for homogeneous and differentiated products while information should be more important for differentiated products. Thus Rauch and Trindade interpret their finding as evidence for the information story. I think their interesting finding says little about the importance of information vs. security.
Opportunism in differentiated products has much wider scope ---quality assessment is more difficult to verify with a third party for example, less is contractible and contracts are more incomplete. The small tightly knit Chinese communities of Southeast Asia function in an environment of weak official enforcement. (The Rauch and Trindade study did not use survey data on insecurity to control for country differences in formal security as in Anderson and Marcouiller, 1999.) More work may eventually decompose ethnic ties into information and security components, but this is a subtle matter. Information about aspects of insecurity is obviously important and tends to confound the two explanations at a deep level.
Conclusion
I have shown that the missing trade puzzle is important and contains complex patterns: there is massive reduction of trade by distance and by international borders, and this reduction of trade varies over time and space. I have argued that progress on modeling the missing trade is possible. The argument is illustrated with brief reviews of several lines of theory on the one hand and of empirics on the other hand. If none of the attempts at progress is convincing in itself, I hope the reader is stimulated to provide a better alternative.
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